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Abstract
Quantum pre- and post-selection (PPS) paradoxes occur when counterfactual inferences
are made about different measurements that might have been performed, between two mea-
surements that are actually performed. The 3 box paradox is the paradigm example of such a
paradox, where a ball is placed in one of three boxes and it is inferred that it would have been
found, with certainty, both in box 1 and in box 2 had either box been opened on their own.
Precisely what is at stake in PPS paradoxes has been unclear, and classical models have been
suggested which are supposed to mimic the essential features of the problem. We show that
the essential difference between the classical and quantum pre- and post-selection effects lies in
the fact that for a quantum PPS paradox to occur the intervening measurement, had it been
performed, would need to be invasive but non-detectable. This invasiveness is required even
for null result measurements. While some quasi-classical features (such as non-contextuality
and macrorealism) are compatible with PPS paradoxes, it seems no fully classical model of
the 3 box paradox is possible.
1 Introduction
The quantum 3 Box Paradox[AV91] effect has now been experimentally confirmed in a number of
different contexts[RLS04, KSY+11] with the most up-to-date tests[GRM+12] violating a measure
of classicality by over seven standard deviations. As the paradigm example of a quantum pre- and
post-selection (PPS) paradox there has been much discussion of its meaning. Questions raised
include the validity of the counterfactual use of the ABL rule[SS93, Coh95, Kas03], connections to
quantum contextuality proofs and measurement disturbance[LS05b, LS05a] and whether classical
systems can simulate the essential properties of a PPS paradox[Kir03, LS05a].
Ravon and Vaidman[RV07] have rejected these classical comparisons, on the basis that they
introduce a measurement disturbance. They argue that the essence of the 3 Box Paradox is that in
the classical case there is no reason to suppose the measurement could introduce such a disturbance.
This paper analyses the role played by measurement disturbances in PPS paradoxes and shows
precisely what is non-classical about the 3 Box Paradox. The ontic model framework (introduced in
[Spe05]) will be used to show how measurement disturbance plays a novel role in PPS paradoxes:
the existence of a true PPS paradox requires a measurement disturbance which is necessarily
invasive, but non-detectable.
We will show:
• The Kirkpatrick[Kir03] and Leifer and Spekkens[LS05a] examples are of a different kind to
the 3 Box Paradox. They involve detectable measurement disturbances that are not present
in the 3 Box Paradox, so cannot reproduce the same statistics. The absence of such detectable
disturbances are essential for the 3 Box Paradox, and to any true PPS paradox.
• However, the key feature of a PPS paradox, which is not present in any simpler system than
the 3 Box Paradox, is that although the measurement has no detectable effect, it must in fact
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disturb the actual state of the system. Although this is similar to a result obtained by Leifer
and Spekkens, they proved only that a non-contextual model must introduce measurement
disturbances. Here we will show any model of a PPS paradox must involve non-detectable
disturbances.
• We will then show how this kind of disturbance can be related to violations of the Leggett
Garg Inequality[LG85], which may also be argued to test for a form of measurement dis-
turbance. We show that a PPS paradox holds if, and only if, a Leggett Garg Inequality is
violated. This is surprising, as in 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces the Leggett Garg Inequality
can only be violated for detectable measurement disturbances. This analysis has already
been applied in experimental tests of the 3 Box Paradox[GRM+12], showing large violations
of this classicality measure.
• Finally explicit examples will be constructed of models which can reproduce the 3 Box
Paradox results exactly, while still satisfying certain classical conditions such as macrorealism
or non-contextual value definiteness.
2 The 3 Box Paradox
2.1 The adversarial game
Alice proposes a game to Bob. She has three indistinguishable boxes, which she puts in three
positions. She puts the a ball in the box in position 3, throws a blanket over the boxes and under
cover of the blanket shuffles the boxes around. The blanket is removed and Bob is allowed to look
in either the box in position 1 or position 2. Alice is blindfolded for this, so she is unaware which
box Bob looks in (an umpire is present to ensure Bob does not cheat). Alice then shuffles the boxes
around again under cover of her blanket, and looks in the box in position 3. She wins if, whenever
she sees a ball in box 3, Bob also saw the ball in the box he opened. She offers Bob better than
fifty-fifty odds that she will get it right. If she does not see a ball, no bets are placed.
Bob is understandably suspicious. Perhaps there is some mark being left by the act of opening
the box? To convince Bob this is not the case, Alice makes four suggestions:
1. Alice gets the umpire to verify that no matter which box Bob checks, the relative frequency
with which the ball ends up in position 3 is the same as when no box is checked.
2. Alice promises this: if Bob chooses, he can instead look twice in succession, using the same
measurement or the two different measurements. If Bob finds the ball changes boxes or finds
two balls, then he wins immediately. Otherwise he loses immediately.
3. Alice allows Bob to check the ball location by other means, such as by connecting a spring to
the box and seeing if the box is lifted by a force above the weight of the box but below that
of the box and ball together. An empty box is lifted but a full box should be undisturbed.
4. Finally Bob gets to test that he can put the ball in any one of the boxes, perform his different
measurements, and then perform any test he likes to see if he can detect any effect of the
measurement (he can’t).
Bob thinks about this and decides to play the game. He can’t see any way Alice can know which
box Bob checked (he’s right - Alice doesn’t know which box Bob checked). He reasons that,
provided he chooses the boxes to check randomly, Alice can’t do better than a fifty-fifty guess
whether Bob saw the ball, however she places it. Still, Alice proceeds to beat him on every round
that bets are placed and cleans up.
2.2 The quantum game
The state |i〉 represents the ball being in box i. Initially prepare the system to be in state |3〉.
Alice’s initial shuffle is any unitary which satisfies
UI |3〉 = 1√
3
(|1〉+ |2〉+ |3〉)
2
.
Three possibilities are allowed for the intervening measurement
• M1: A projective measurement onto |1〉 〈1 | , 12 (|2〉 〈2 |+ |3〉 〈3 |), with outcomes 1 and ¬1;
• M2: A projection measurement onto |2〉 〈2 | , 12 (|1〉 〈1 |+ |3〉 〈3 |), with outcomes 2 and ¬2.
• N : Do nothing;
After the intervening measurement, Alice’s final shuffle is any unitary which satisfies
UF
1√
3
(|1〉+ |2〉 − |3〉) = |3〉
Then for the final measurement perform MA, Alice performs a projection measurement onto
|3〉 〈3 | , 12 (|1〉 〈1 |+ |2〉 〈2 |), with outcomes A and ¬A. (We will simplify the later analysis by
merging the effects of UF into MA.)
The three sequences give the statistics:
M1
PM1(1, A) = 1/9 PM1(¬1, A) = 0
PM1(1,¬A) = 2/9 PM1(¬1,¬A) = 2/3
M2
PM2(2, A) = 1/9 PM2(¬2, A) = 0
PM2(2,¬A) = 2/9 PM2(¬2,¬A) = 2/3
N PN (A) = 1/9
from which it can be seen PM1 (1|A) = PM2(2|A) = 1
Using these results Alice is certain to win. So why was Bob tempted to play this game? Ravon
and Vaidman argue that it is something to do with Bob believing that his measurement does
not disturb the system. They argue that in attempts to classically model pre- and post-selection
paradoxes, the intervening measurement leaves a mark that makes the post selection impossible
ie. when Box 1 is opened, if the ball is not observed, then there is some record left of this which
prevents the ball ending up in Box 3 for Alice’s measurement. In the case of the 3 Box Paradox,
they argue there is no reason to suppose that a classical measurement can disturb the system in
this way.
3 Measurement disturbance in PPS Paradoxes
3.1 Non-detectable measurements
We now highlight an important property of a PPS paradox, absent from the discussion of[Kir03,
LS05a, RV07]: that Bob’s measurements should be non-detectable by Alice.
Bob’s measurement Mi is a non-detectable measurement (NDM) for Alice, if and only if
PN (A) =
∑
j
PMi (A,Qi,j) (1)
where Qi,j are the possible outcomes of the Mi measurement. Alice can gain no information about
what measurement Bob performed (or if Bob even performed a measurement) from the statistics
of her measurement outcome.
This might seem a reasonable requirement, in itself. After all, in some of the adversarial
games considered (including the 3 Box Paradox) it is not hard to see that if Alice were to have
information about what measurement Bob performed, then she could win at the adversarial game
without needing to resort to quantum theory. Although such situations allow Alice to win, there
is no special mystery to how.
Perhaps more importantly, Sharp and Shanks[SS93], and Cohen[Coh95] demonstrated that
attempting to combine post-selective inferences when Bob’s measurements disturb Alice’s mea-
surement results, will in general lead to inconsistent probabilistic predictions.
A simple example of the problem can be given. Suppose Bob performs a measurementM , with
a particular outcome Q, and then Alice performs measurement MA, with outcomes A and ¬A.
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We can calculate the post-selective inferences PM (Q|A) = PM (Q,A)/PM (A) and PM (Q|¬A) =
PM (Q,¬A)/PM (¬A).
Let us assume that these post-selective inferences are valid even if Bob did not make an inter-
vening measurement. When Alice observes outcome A, she infers Bob would have observed Q with
probability PM (Q|A), had he actually made the measurement. Similarly if she observes outcome
¬A, she infers Bob would have observed Q with probability PM (Q|¬A), had he actually made the
measurement.
Now consider if these inferences are indeed valid, when Bob does not make the measurement,
and Alice then observes the probabilities PN (A) and PN (¬A). Alice is led to calculate that,
had Bob actually made the measurement, he would have observed Q with probability P (Q) =
PM (Q|A)PN (A) + PM (Q|¬A)PN (¬A). This is plainly inconsistent with Alice’s knowledge that,
had Bob actually made the measurement, he would have observed Q with probability P (Q) =
PM (Q|A)PM (A) + PM (Q|¬A)PM (¬A). The only way the combination of inferences could be
consistent with Alice’s knowledge is if PN (A) = PM (A) and PN (¬A) = PM (¬A): in other words,
if Bob’s measurement is non-detectable by Alice.
As we show in the appendix, none of the classical models of pre- and post-selection paradoxes
presented in the literature[Kir03, LS05a, RV07] are non-detectable. All involve intervening mea-
surements which change the statistics of the final post-selection measurement. This is not the case
in the 3 Box Paradox.
This leaves open the question as to whether a classical model can, in fact, reproduce the
statistics of the 3 Box Paradox, in full, and whether the intervening measurements must disturb
the system1, even though this disturbance cannot be detected.
3.2 Invasiveness without detectability
Any given experimental arrangement is characterised by a preparation process, E, and a measure-
ment process, M , with distinct outcomes Q. Operationally, this is characterised by a probability
P(E,M)(Q). In the case of quantum theory P(E,M)(Q) = |〈Q |E〉|2.
The ontic state of the system represents the actual state of the world. This might simply
be taken to be the quantum wavefunction for the system, or might represent additional ‘hidden’
variables or elements of reality. A non-invasive measurement (NIM) is a measurement which does
not disturb the ontic state of the system.
we apply the ontic model framework[Spe05, Rud06, HS07, HR07] to prove that, even though
the intervening measurement in the 3 Box Paradox is NDM, it still disturbs the ontic state of the
system and cannot be NIM.
1. A preparation process E produces a probabilistic distribution µE(λ) over the ontic states λ.
Any convex sum µ(λ) =
∑
wEµE(λ) (
∑
wE = 1, wE ≥ 0), is also a valid preparation.
NB.
∫
λ
µE(λ) = 1.
2. A measurement M is represented by an outcome function, giving the probability of outcome
Q occurring, conditional upon the actual ontic state of the system: ξM (Q|λ).
NB.
∑
Q ξM (Q|λ) = 1
3. The operational probabilities must be recovered through the formula:
P(E,M)(Q) =
∫
dλ0µE(λ0)ξM (Q|λ0) (2)
4. The probability of a disturbance of the ontic state by the measurement M , with outcome Q
is given by: γM (λ1|Q, λ0).
NB.
∫
λ1
γM (λ1|Q, λ0) = 1
1Leifer and Spekkens have argued that a non-contextual model must involve measurement disturbance. However,
they do not demonstrate a contextual model must involve disturbance, nor do they give an example of a non-
contextual model that reproduces the 3 Box Paradox statistics.
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5. After the measurement, with outcome Q, the new preparation state will be:
µQ(λ) =
∫
dλ0µE(λ0)ξM (Q|λ0)γM (λ|Q, λ0) (3)
Non-invasive measurability: A measurement which has no effect on the ontic state is called
a Non-Invasive Measurement (NIM). It is represented by
γM (λ1|Q, λ0) = δ(λ1 − λ0) (4)
We now demonstrate the following: the 3 Box Paradox necessarily involves invasive measure-
ments of the ontic state. The application of the ontic model formalism quickly gives:
PM1(1, A) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µ(λ0)ξM1 (A|λ0)γM1(λ1|1, λ0)ξMA (A|λ1) (5)
PM2(2, A) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µ(λ0)ξM2 (2|λ0)γM2 (λ1|2, λ0)ξMA(A|λ1) (6)
PN (A) =
∫
dλ0µ(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) (7)
PM1(A, 1) + PM2(A, 2) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µ(λ0)ξMA (A|λ1) [ξM2(2|λ0)γM2(λ1|2, λ0)
+ξM1(1|λ0)γM1(λ1|1, λ0)] (8)
We will now assume NIM and show that no PPS paradox can arise.
Consider the overlap between the functions ξM2(2|λ) and ξM1(1|λ). Are there available ontic
states µ(λ) > 0 such that ξM2(2|λ)ξM1 (1|λ) 6= 0?
If M1 and M2 are NIM, then a measurement of M1 followed by M2 would give the result:
PM2,M1(2, 1) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µ(λ0)ξM1(1|λ0)γM1(λ1|1, λ0)ξM2 (2|λ1)
=
∫
dλ0µ(λ0)ξM1(1|λ0)ξM2(2|λ0) (9)
If there is a non-zero overlap, then PM2,M1(2, 1) > 0. But this means Bob could open Box 1, see
a ball inside, then open Box 2 and see a second ball! Bob would clearly cry “foul” at this point!
After all, Alice simply putting a ball in both boxes is a very easy way for her to win, and involves
no paradox at all. We take it that no parties to the discussion would regard this as an acceptable
classical explanation of the 3 Box Paradox. We require PM2,M1(2, 1) = 0. Hence the 3 Box Paradox
requires that, if M1 and M2 are NIM, then ξM2 (2|λ)ξM1(1|λ) = 0.
Now ξM1(1|λ) ≤ 1 and ξM2(2|λ) ≤ 1 which together with ξM2(2|λ)ξM1 (1|λ) = 0 gives
ξM2 (2|λ) + ξM1(1|λ) ≤ 1 (10)
It follows that for NIM measurements, where γM1(λ1|1, λ0) = γM2(λ1|2, λ0) = δ (λ1 − λ0):
PM1(A, 1) + PM2(A, 2) =
∫
dλ0dλ1µ(λ0)ξMA (A|λ1) [ξM2(2|λ0)γM2(λ1|2, λ0)
+ξM1(1|λ0)γM1(λ1|1, λ0)]
=
∫
dλ0µ(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) [ξM2(2|λ0) + ξM1(1|λ0)]
≤
∫
dλ0µ(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) = PN (A) (11)
So NIM implies
PM1(A, 1) + PM2(A, 2) ≤ PN (A) (12)
But the 3 Box Paradox occurs precisely because PM1(A, 1)+PM2 (A, 2) > PN (A). As PN (A) =
PM1(A) = PM2(A), it is simple to rewrite this as PM1(1|A) + PM2(2|A) > 1. This is precisely the
condition that allows Alice to offer fifty-fifty odds to Bob, yet still expect to win the adversarial
game on average.
Hence we conclude there are no possible ontic models for the 3 Box Paradox for which M1 and
M2 are both NIM, despite the fact that the M1 and M2 measurements are both NDM.
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4 The Leggett-Garg Inequality
We have seen that there are two ideas that are necessary for Bob to believe that he has a fair chance
at the adversarial game: that the ball is always in one and only one box; that measurement does
not disturb the system. These assumptions are essentially the same assumptions that have been
discussed extensively in the context of the Leggett Garg Inequality, under the names macrorealism
and non-invasive measurability:
1. Macrorealism per se. A macroscopic system which has available to it two or more
macroscopically distinct states is at any given time in a definite one of those states.
2. Non-invasive measurability. It is possible in principle to determine which of these
states the system is in without any effect on the state itself or on the subsequent
system dynamics.
[LG85]
The Leggett Garg Inequality has so far been studied exclusively in the context of 2-dimensional
Hilbert spaces. In [MT12] it is argued that in these situations a Leggett Garg Inequality can only
be broken if NDM is violated. Here we have argued that a true PPS paradox requires NDM is not
violated.
However, given the clear similarity between the conditions for a PPS paradox and the conditions
for the violation of a Leggett Garg Inequality, it is interesting to ask if there is a connection. We
will now show that, in the case of 3-dimensional Hilbert spaces, it is possible to violate a Leggett
Garg Inequality without violating NDM. A PPS paradox is possible, and Alice can expect to win
at the adversarial game, if and only if this Leggett Garg Inequality is violated.
4.1 Macrorealism
Macrorealism: The ball is always in one box, and only in one box. There may be a probability
distribution over which box the ball is in, but this must be understood strictly as some form of
epistemic uncertainty. In the language of ontic models, we can express this as saying that any
preparation µ(λ) is of the form
µ(λ) = p1ν1(λ) + p2ν2(λ) + p3ν3(λ) (13)
where νi(λ) > 0 only if ξM (i|λ) = 1 for all measurementsM which include the outcome i. In other
words, ν1(λ) is a distribution over ontic states which are certain to be found in Box 1 whenever
they are looked for, and similarly for ν2(λ) and Box 2 etc. Such a model is non-contextually
outcome definite for the macrorealist basis2.
4.2 Non-invasiveness
For macrorealist theories, there are two ways non-invasiveness can enter into the analysis, that are
weaker than NIM, but still able to produce the Leggett Garg Inequality.
• NIM1. It is possible to determine if the ball is in Box 1 without disturbing the ball when it
is actually found in Box 1 (carefully test if the weight of the box is greater than an empty
box, for example).
According to NIM1, after we have opened Box 1, and observed that the ball is in the box,
the post-measurement preparation state is ν1(λ).
This means PM1(A|1) =
∫
dλ0ν1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0). Similar statements hold for Box 2 and M2.
• NIM2. It is possible to determine if the ball is in Box 1 without disturbing the ball when it is
not actually found in Box 1 (just open Box 1 and don’t touch the other boxes, for example).
According to NIM2, after we have opened Box 1, and observed that the ball is not in the
box, the post-measurement preparation state is p2ν2(λ)+p3ν3(λ)
p2+p3
.
This means PM1(A|¬1) =
∫
dλ0
p2ν2(λ)+p3ν3(λ)
p2+p3
ξMA(A|λ0). Similar statements hold for Box 2
and M2.
2It does not immediately run into problems with the Kochen Specker theorem, however, as it only requires this
to hold for a single basis.
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NIM2 is a statement about null result measurements and intuitively might seem more forceful
than NIM1. Our previous result shows at least one of them is false. In fact, either of these lead to
contradictions with the 3 Box Paradox, so both must be false.
First we note that
PN (A) =
∫
dλ0(p1ν1(λ0) + p2ν2(λ0) + p3ν3(λ0))ξMA(A|λ0) (14)
NIM1 implies straightforwardly that
PM1(A|1) =
∫
dλ0ν1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0)
PM2(A|2) =
∫
dλ0ν2(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) (15)
As
∫
dλ0p3ν3(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) ≥ 0 it follows
PN (A) ≥ p1PM1(A|1) + p2PM2(A|2)
NIM2, on the other hand, implies:
PM1(A|¬1) =
∫
dλ0
p2ν2(λ) + p3ν3(λ)
p2 + p3
ξMA(A|λ0)
PM2(A|¬2) =
∫
dλ0
p1ν1(λ) + p3ν3(λ)
p1 + p3
ξMA(A|λ0) (16)
Now we have
(p2 + p3)PM1(A|¬1) + (p1 + p3)PM2 (A|¬2) ≥ PN (A) ≥ p1PM1(A|1) + p2PM2(A|2) (17)
As PM1(A|¬1) = PM2(A|¬2) = 0, p1PM1(A|1) = p2PM2(A|2) = 1/9 and PN (A) = 1/9, this
would give 0 ≥ 1/9 ≥ 2/9 and we have our contradictions (see also[SGM08] for a related analysis
using path integrals).
4.3 Deriving the Inequality
This can now be cast into the terms of a Leggett Garg Inequality violation. If we assign the value
Q = +1 when the ball is in Box 1 or Box 2, and Q = −1 when the ball is in Box 3, the possible
sequences of values are:
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q
+1
Box 1: -1
A: +1
-1
Box 2: -1 -1
Box 3: +1 +3
Box 1: -1
¬A: -1
-1
Box 2: -1 -1
Box 3: +1 -1
with Q = Q1Q2 + Q2Q3 + Q1Q3. Any probability distribution over these possible outcomes
will give −1 ≤ 〈Q〉 ≤ 3. This is the Leggett Garg Inequality.
Clearly it is not possible to determine Q2 directly with the measurements available to Alice
and Bob. However, with the additional assumption of either NIM1 or NIM2, we can calculate a
value for 〈Q〉 from the observed data to which a macrorealist would be committed, and obtain a
contradiction.
We use macrorealism to assume that, even when Bob performs no measurement, there was a
matter of fact as to which Box was occupied:
PN (A, 1) =
∫
dλ0p1ν1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) (18)
and similarly for PN (A, 2) PN (¬A, 1), etc. and substitute these into 〈Q〉.
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〈Q〉 = 3PN (A, 3)− (PN (A, 1) + PN (¬A, 1) + PN (A, 2) + PN (¬A, 2) + PN (¬A, 3)) (19)
We now need to use NIM1 or NIM2 to be able to recast this in terms of the probabilities
actually observed in Alice and Bob’s measurements:
M1
PM1(1, A) PM1(¬1, A)
PM1(1,¬A) PM1(¬1,¬A)
M2
PM2(2, A) PM2(¬2, A)
PM2(2,¬A) PM2(¬2,¬A)
N PN (A)
4.3.1 NIM1
If we assume NIM1, we have
PN (A, 1) =
∫
dλ0p1ν1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0) = PM1(A, 1) (20)
and similarly PN (A, 2) = PM2(A, 2). From this PN (A, 3) = PN (A) − PM1(A, 1) − PM2 (A, 2). For
¬A, the results PN (¬A, 1) = PM1(¬A, 1), PN (¬A, 2) = PM2(¬A, 2) and PN (¬A, 3) = PN (¬A) −
PM1(¬A, 1)− PM2(¬A, 2) hold.
4.3.2 NIM2
If we assume NIM2, we must use
PN (A, 2) + PN (A, 3) =
∫
dλ0 (p2ν2(λ0) + p3ν3(λ0)) ξMA(A|λ0) = PM1(A,¬1) (21)
and similarly PM2(A,¬2) = PN (A, 1) + PN (A, 3), to get
PN (A) = PN (A, 1) + PN (A, 2) + PN (A, 3)
PM1(A) = PM1(A, 1) + PN (A, 2) + PN (A, 3)
PM2(A) = PN (A, 1) + PM2(A, 2) + PN (A, 3) (22)
As PN (A) = PM1(A) = PM2(A) it follows PN (A, 1) = PM1(A, 1) etc. and so we have the same
results as for NIM1.
4.3.3 Leggett Garg Inequality
Substituting out all terms not directly observed for those we can measure, we obtain an expression
that can be tested against experimental data:
〈QOBS〉 = − (PM1(A, 1) + PM1(¬A, 1) + PM2(A, 2) + PM2(¬A, 2) + PN (¬A)
−PM1(¬A, 1)− PM2(¬A, 2)) + 3 (PN (A) − PM1(A, 1)− PM2 (A, 2))
= 4(PN (A)− PM1 (A, 1)− PM2(A, 2))− 1 (23)
The Leggett Garg Inequality can be violated if, and only if PN (A) − PM1 (A, 1)− PM2(A, 2) < 0.
This can be rewritten:
PM1(1|A) + PM2(2|A) > 1 (24)
Once again this is the condition for which Alice might offer reasonable seeming odds to Bob, and
yet still be sure of winning on average. This completes the proof that a PPS paradox occurs, and
Alice can expect to win her adversarial game, if and only if a related Leggett Garg inequality is
violated.
The 3 Box Paradox gives PM1(1|A) + PM2(2|A) = 2 and PN (A) = 1/9. This gives
〈QOBS〉 = −13
9
< −1
Experimental realisations of the 3 Box Paradox[GRM+12] have demonstrated this violation of the
Leggett Garg Inequality by over 7 standard deviations.
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4.4 Macrorealism and Non-detectable measurements
In discussion of the Leggett Garg Inequality (in particular [Cli91, BGG94, MT12]) it has been
argued NIM is too strong a condition to rule out macrorealism, as it is sufficient to derive the
Leggett Garg Inequality by itself without assuming macrorealism. The analysis of Section 3.2
supports this conclusion. As Equations 12 and 23 show, NIM will imply −1 ≤ 〈QOBS〉 ≤ 3, must
hold for any ontic model, macrorealist or not.
However, in [MT12] it is argued that a weaker condition than NIM does rule out some forms
of macrorealism. This weaker condition is simply that the intervening measurement is NDM for
eigenstate preparations of the macrorealist observable. Unlike NIM, this condition may opera-
tionally verified. It is straightforward to show that quantum theory predicts M1 and M2 are NDM
for any eigenstate preparations |1〉, |2〉 and |3〉.
The eigenstate preparation |i〉 is represented by a probability distribution over the ontic states
of µi(λ). A statistical mixture of such eigenstate preparations is represented by
µM (λ) = p1µ1(λ) + p2µ2(λ) + p3µ3(λ) (25)
The macrorealist would represent a superposition of eigenstates by
µS(λ) = p1ν1(λ) + p2ν2(λ) + p3ν3(λ) (26)
where νi(λ) > 0 only if ξM (i|λ) = 1 for all measurements.
In [MT12] three possible approaches to macrorealism are identified:
MR1: ν1(λ) is the same distribution over the ontic states as you would get if you prepared the
system to definitely be in Box 1: ν1(λ) = µ1(λ).
MR2: ν1(λ) is a distribution over the same set of ontic states as you would get if you prepared the
system to definitely be in Box 1, but is a different distribution: If ν1(λ) > 0 then µ1(λ) > 0
but ν1(λ) 6= µ1(λ).
MR3: ν1(λ) includes novel ontic states which do not appear when the system is prepared to
definitely be in Box 1. There exists λ for which ν1(λ) > 0 but µ1(λ) = 0
with equivalent statements for ν2(λ) and Box 2 etc.
Only MR1 is incompatible with the 3 Box Paradox. For this we will need to demonstrate that
µ(λ) = p1µ1(λ) + p2µ2(λ) + p3µ3(λ)
cannot give rise to a 3 Box Paradox.
As µ1(λ) is equivalent to preparing the system to be in Box 1, it corresponds to the eigenstate
|1〉. M1 is operationally verified to be NDM for the eigenstate preparation |1〉. This means that
the post-measurement preparation µ′1(λ), given by:
µ′1(λ) =
∫
dλ0µ1(λ0)ξM1(1|λ0)γM1(λ|1, λ0) (27)
must be empirically indistinguishable from µ1(λ). It follows that:
PM1(A, 1) =
∫
dλ0p1µ
′
1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0)
=
∫
dλ0p1µ1(λ0)ξMA(A|λ0)
= PN (A, 1) (28)
The Leggett Garg Inequality now follows exactly as for the case of NIM1 above. MR1 is therefore
unable to account for the statistics of the 3 Box Paradox. Two important features may be pointed
out:
• This rejection of MR1 does not assume any form of NIM. The operationally verifiable proper-
ties that the measurementsM1 andM2 are NDM for the eigenstate preparations are sufficient
to rule out MR1 without appeal to NIM.
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• In 2 dimensional Hilbert spaces, a violation of the Leggett Garg Inequality may also be
used to rule out MR1[MT12]. This requires verifying two intervening measurements are
NDM for eigenstate preparations, then demonstrating they are not NDM for superposition
preparations. In the 3 Box paradox, the intervening measurements are verifiably NDM even
for the superposition preparation. Nevertheless, the Leggett Garg inequality is still violated
and MR1 is ruled out.
However, we will demonstrate in Sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2, by explicit construction, that MR2 and
MR3 are compatible with the 3 Box Paradox.
5 Ontic Models for the 3 Box Paradox
We have shown the connection of the 3 Box Paradox to measurement invasiveness and to the
Leggett Garg Inequality. We have also argued that the classical models of [Kir03, LS05a, RV07]
fail to reproduce a key feature of the PPS paradoxes.
We will now ask how classical can an ontic model be and yet still reproduce the 3 Box Paradox?
In particular we will be concerned with the question of macrorealism, as in the Leggett Garg
analysis, and outcome definite non-contextuality, as discussed by Leifer and Spekkens3.
We exhibit three ontic models that are able to satisfy macrorealism and non-contextuality,
while exactly reproducing all the relevant statistics of the 3 Box Paradox, including the NDM
property of Bob’s measurements.
5.1 Alice’s Cheating NIM Model
The simplest way to reproduce the basic statistics of the 3 Box Paradox was implicitly suggested
in Section 3.2, and even manages to be NIM. Alice needs only four ontic states, λ1 − λ4, which
respond deterministically and non-invasively to the measurements M1,M2 and MA:
ξM (q|λ) M1 M2 MA1 ¬1 2 ¬2 A ¬A
λ1 1 0 0 1 0 1
λ2 0 1 1 0 0 1
λ3 0 1 0 1 0 1
λ4 1 0 1 0 1 0
Both measurements M1 and M3 are NIM. Now the preparation:
µ+(λ) =
1
9
(2δ (λ− λ1) + 2δ (λ− λ2) + 4δ (λ− λ3) + δ (λ− λ4)) (29)
successfully reproduces the statistics of the measurement sequences (MA), (M1,MA) and (M2,MA)
exactly as in the 3 Box Paradox. However, it fails to reproduce the statistics of (M1,M2). The
ontic state λ4 is a cheat: Alice has simply placed a ball in Box 1 and another in Box 2. She knows
for certain that in those cases Bob will definitely see a ball if he looks in either Box 1 or Box 2,
and only plays the game in those cases.
5.2 Alice’s Macrorealist Models
We now give the first complete description of ontic models that describe the 3 Box Paradox in
which there is only one ball and which is at all times in one and only one box. The model is outcome
deterministic and measurement non-contextual. This provides a constructive counterexample to
any claim that PPS paradoxes necessarily imply contextuality4
3Recall from [Spe05], that in the ontic models framework, outcome definite non-contextuality means that
ξM (Q|λ) ∈ {0, 1} ∀λ and that if Q is an outcome shared by two different measurement procedures M1 and M2 then
ξM1(Q|λ) = ξM2 (Q|λ) ∀λ. The Kochen-Specker theorem demonstrates that any ontic model for quantum theory
must violate these conditions for some ontic states.
4Recall that Leifer and Spekkens paper showed that if an outcome definite non-contextual model existed for a
given PPS paradox, then it could not be NIM. This did not prove that such a model actually exists!
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For this we need sixteen ontic states. States λ1 − λ4 are in Box 1, states λ5 − λ8 are in Box 2
and states λ9 − λ16 are in Box 3.
The measurement outcomes are:
Box1 Box2 Box3
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 λ7 λ8 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12 λ13 λ14 λ15 λ16
M1 1 ¬1 ¬1
M2 ¬2 2 ¬2
MA ¬A A A ¬A ¬A A A ¬A ¬A A A ¬A A ¬A ¬A A
Bob’s measurements can also change the ontic state:
Box1 Box2 Box3
λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 λ7 λ8 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12 λ13 λ14 λ15 λ16
M1 λ1 λ2 λ1 λ2 λ5 λ6 λ7 λ8 λ9 λ10 λ9 λ10 λ13 λ14 λ13 λ14
M2 λ1 λ2 λ3 λ4 λ5 λ6 λ5 λ6 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12 λ9 λ10 λ11 λ12
Note that none of the states change boxes as a result of the measurement.
The ontic states λ3, λ4, λ7, λ8, λ11−λ16 contain additional structure that allows them to change
state when one of the boxes is tested. As we have shown in Sections 3.2 and 4, this disturbance is
a necessary feature of any ontic model that hopes to reproduce a PPS paradox.
5.2.1 MR3
It is now straightforward to verify that the following preparations:
µ|1〉(λ) =
1
3
(2δ (λ− λ1) + δ (λ− λ2))
µ|2〉(λ) =
1
3
(2δ (λ− λ5) + δ (λ− λ6))
µ|3〉(λ) =
1
3
(2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ10))
µ|1+3〉(λ) =
1
6
(2δ (λ− λ1) + δ (λ− λ4) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ12))
µ|2+3〉(λ) =
1
6
(2δ (λ− λ5) + δ (λ− λ8) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ14)) (30)
µ|1+2+3〉(λ) =
1
9
(2δ (λ− λ1) + δ (λ− λ4) 2δ (λ− λ5) + δ (λ− λ8) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ16))
produce exactly the right probabilities for all sequences of measurements: (MA), (M1,MA),
(M2,MA), (M1,M2,MA), (M2,M1,MA), (M1,M1,MA), (M2,M2,MA) etc.
This is a macrorealist theory of type MR3: superpositions involve novel ontic states (λ4, λ8, λ12, λ14, λ16),
which do not appear in the eigenstate preparations.
5.2.2 MR2
We now exploit preparation contextuality5 to extend the previous model to show how MR2 macro-
realist constructions are possible for the 3 Box Paradox: all ontic states can occur within eigenstate
preparations. To achieve this we must include the previously unused ontic states: λ3, λ7, λ11, λ13
and λ15.
Let a1, a3, a, b, c > 0, and a1, a3, (a+b+c) < 1/3. These are preparation contextual parameters.
Different physical processes for preparing operational states may lead to different values of these
parameters. The following preparations include all the ontic states available, and will reproduce
the correct measurement statistics for M1, M2 and MA:
5Preparation contextuality is the property that two distinct physical processes for preparing identical quantum
states may have µ1(λ) 6= µ2(λ).
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µ|1〉(λ) =
(
2
3
− a1
)
δ (λ− λ1) +
(
1
3
− a1
)
δ (λ− λ2) + a1 (δ (λ− λ3) + δ (λ− λ4))
µ|2〉(λ) =
(
2
3
− a2
)
δ (λ− λ5) +
(
1
3
− a2
)
δ (λ− λ6) + a2 (δ (λ− λ7) + δ (λ− λ8))
µ|3〉(λ) =
(
2
3
− (a+ b+ c)
)
δ (λ− λ9) +
(
1
3
− (a+ b+ c)
)
δ (λ− λ10) (31)
+a (δ (λ− λ11) + δ (λ− λ12)) + b (δ (λ− λ13) + δ (λ− λ14)) + c (δ (λ− λ15) + δ (λ− λ16))
However, there is no preparation contextuality for the superposition preparations:
µ|2+3〉(λ) =
1
6
(2δ (λ− λ5) + δ (λ− λ8) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ14))
µ|1+3〉(λ) =
1
6
(2δ (λ− λ1) + δ (λ− λ4) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ12)) (32)
µ|1+2+3〉(λ) =
1
9
(2δ (λ− λ1) + δ (λ− λ4) 2δ (λ− λ5) + δ (λ− λ8) + 2δ (λ− λ9) + δ (λ− λ16))
These remain the only way to reproduce the correct measurement statistics forM1,M3 andMA for
these ontic states. The ability to include the additional ontic states in the eigenstate preparations
does not play any role in the 3 Box Paradox itself.
It should be noted here that this MR2 model is possible only with preparation contextuality
for the eigenstates. This is not necessarily the case for the 2-dimensional Hilbert space models
that satisfy MR2. So, although the 3 Box Paradox does not rule out MR2 models, it may place
further constraints on what is necessary to make them succeed.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that PPS paradoxes necessarily violate NIM - the intervening measurements must
disturb the ontic state. We would like to emphasise that this must be the case for any ontic model
for a PPS paradox, including standard quantum theory with only the wavefunction representing
the ontic state. It does not just hold for ontic models involving hidden variables or which are
measurement non-contextual, or outcome deterministic, or macrorealist.
We can now provide clear answers to the questions: Why would Bob have considered it rea-
sonable to play the adversarial game? What exactly is non-classical about the 3 Box Paradox?
If we consider the four suggestions Alice makes in Section 2.1, that convince Bob to play the
game, they correspond to our analysis as follows:
1. The intervening measurements are NDM. There is no obvious sense in which the measurement
is leaving a mark that Alice can read.
2. Bob can verify that PM2,M1(2, 1) = 0. Alice’s Cheating Model is ruled out.
3. If Bob is convinced that his measurement cannot introduce any disturbance to the system,
he believes NIM holds, and would now be willing to play the game. If he accepts any form of
macrorealism, and simultaneously believes either NIM1 (his measurement cannot introduce
any disturbance to the box he is measuring) or NIM2 (his measurement cannot introduce
any disturbance to the boxes he is not measuring) then he would also now be willing to play
the game.
4. Bob can verify that his intervening measurements are NDM for eigenstate preparations. If
he believes in the MR1 form of macrorealism, he would be willing to play the game.
The ontic models given in Section 5.2 have not been presented with the kind of simple classical
examples as Kirkpatrick’s card games or Leifer and Spekken’s shaken boxes. Nevertheless they
display some of the minimum requirements for a classical account of the 3 Box Paradox: the ontic
state at all times is in one, and only one, of the boxes, and this does not change as a result of the
measurement. The additional classical intuitions that must be violated for the 3 Box Paradox to
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occur all involve measurement disturbance. It is these properties that a classical account of the 3
Box Paradox would need to address.
The fact that the intervening measurements are NDM but cannot be NIM indicates immediately
that there must be additional hidden properties to any macrorealist model. That we can verify
the intervening measurements are NDM for eigenstate preparations shows that MR1 macrorealism
is ruled out, and superpositions have to be represented by novel distributions over these hidden
properties. That these hidden properties do not satisfy NIM2 is perhaps the biggest obstacle to a
classical description: opening a box must leave a record in these hidden properties even if the ball
is not in that box.
The failure of MR1 and of NIM2 has already been noted in the context of the Leggett Garg
Inequality in 2-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The 3 Box Paradox displays a novel feature though:
Bob’s intervening measurements cannot be operationally detected. Alice cannot infer from her
measurement statistics anything about whether Bob performed an operation or not. This is the
characteristic of a true PPS paradox, and is not present in the 2-dimensional case, or in the classical
examples suggested by Leifer and Spekkens or Kirkpatrick.
We now note, though, that for Bob to be sure Alice is not using the simple cheat in Section
5.1 we must include the following protocol in the adversarial game: Bob can choose to perform
M1 and then M2 (or M2 and then M1), and wins immediately if he finds a ball in both boxes.
However, he loses if he finds only one, or no balls. This rules out Alice’s easy cheat, while Alice
still wins all the time on the quantum 3 Box Paradox.
But Bob’s verification that Alice is not cheating would alter the statistics of Alice’s measure-
ment. As no-one would consider Alice’s Cheating Game represents a PPS paradox, it might be
argued that the combination of all three probabilistic inferences P (1|A) = 1, P (2|A) = 1 and
P (1&2|A) = 0 is required. Verifying the third inference involves a measurement that is not NDM.
It might be argued this is no longer a true PPS paradox. This criticism applies to all the general-
isations of the 3 Box Paradox to N Boxes. We intend to explore the further constraints raised by
this additional requirement for a true PPS paradox in a future paper.
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A Ontic Models for PPS Games
Re-writing the classical models for PPS paradoxes considered in [Kir03, LS05a, RV07] in the ontic
model formalism, shows how all involve detectable measurement disturbances.
A.1 Kirkpatrick’s Card Game
In Kirkpatrick’s card game[Kir03], the ontic state is represented by two piles of cards, {Active,
Passive}, containing the following cards {Jack of Spades, Queen of Spades, Jack of Diamonds,
Queen of Diamonds, King of Hearts, King of Hearts}. Opening Box 1 is represented by randomly
picking a card from one of the piles and asking if the Suit is Spade. Opening Box 2 is represented
by asking if the Suit is Diamond. Alice’s post-selection asks if the Face is the King. If the
measurement changes from a Suit to Face question, or vice versa, the card is picked from the
Passive pile, otherwise the card is picked from Active. After the result of the measurement, the
cards are simply restored if the card was taken from Active. If the card was taken from Passive, a
new state is prepared according to the outcome of the measurement. Five ontic states are involved:
λ0: Face=Q. Active={QS,QD}, Passive={JS,JD,2KH}
λ1: Suit=S. Active={JS,QS}, Passive={JD,QD,2KH}
λ2: Suit=D. Active={JD,QD}, Passive={JS,QS,2KH}
λ3: Suit=not-S. Active={JD,QD,2KH}, Passive={JS,QS}
λ4: Suit=not-D. Active={JS,QS,2KH}, Passive={JD,QD}
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The outcomes and updates6 are given in the form (probability of outcome; post measurement
state):
M1 M2 MA
1 ¬1 2 ¬2 A ¬A
λ0 (1/4;λ1) (3/4;λ3) (1/4;λ2) (3/4;λ4) 0 1
λ1 0 (1;λ1) (1;λ1) 0 1/2 1/2
λ2 (1;λ2) 0 0 (1;λ2) 1/2 1/2
λ3 (1;λ3) 0 (1/2;λ3) (1/2;λ3) 0 1
λ4 (1/2;λ4) (1/2;λ4) 0 (1;λ4) 0 1
The initial state is “Face=Q”, from which we can quickly assess the probabilities of the sequences
to be:
M1
PM1(A, 1) = 1/8 PM1(A,¬1) = 0
PM1(¬A, 1) = 1/8 PM1(¬A,¬1) = 3/4
M2
PM2(A, 2) = 1/8 PM2(A,¬2) = 0
PM2(¬A, 2) = 1/8 PM2(¬A,¬2) = 3/4
N PN (A) = 0
While this successfully reproduces the result PM1 (1|A) = PM2(2|A) = 1, it fails to be a true PPS
paradox as PM1 (A) = PM2(A) = 1/8 but PN (A) = 0.
Kirkpatrick’s game is neither non-invasive nor macrorealist (for ontic states λ3 and λ4) in
the sense used in this paper. It is effectively the failure of macrorealism that Kirkpatrick argues
accounts for the quantum properties. It is possible that more complex choices of ontic states could
better reproduce the 3 Box Paradox statistics. Kirkpatrick[Kir07] does suggest such a modification,
in response to Ravon and Vaidman, so that PN (A) 6= 0.
A.2 Ravon and Vaidman’s Card Game
Ravon and Vaidman[RV07] present a simplified card game, based on Kirkpatrick’s. The number
of cards are reduced, by removing the queens.
λ0: Face. Active={}, Passive={JS,JD,KH}
λ1: Suit=S. Active={JS}, Passive={JD,KH}
λ2: Suit=D. Active={JD}, Passive={JS,KH}
λ3: Suit=not-S. Active={JD,KH}, Passive={JS}
λ4: Suit=not-D. Active={JS,KH}, Passive={JD}
The outcomes and updates7 are:
M1 M2 MA
1 ¬1 2 ¬2 A ¬A
λ0 (1/3;λ1) (2/3;λ3) (1/3;λ2) (2/3;λ4) 0 1
λ1 0 (1;λ1) (1;λ1) 0 1/2 1/2
λ2 (1;λ2) 0 0 (1;λ2) 1/2 1/2
λ3 (1;λ3) 0 (1/2;λ3) (1/2;λ3) 0 1
λ4 (1/2;λ4) (1/2;λ4) 0 (1;λ4) 0 1
the initial state is “Face”, giving the probabilities:
M1
PM1(A, 1) = 1/6 PM1(A,¬1) = 0
PM1(¬A, 1) = 1/6 PM1(¬A,¬1) = 2/3
M2
PM2(A, 2) = 1/6 PM2(A,¬2) = 0
PM2(¬A, 2) = 1/6 PM2(¬A,¬2) = 2/3
N PN (A) = 0
6The updates for measuring M1 on λ4 and M2 on λ3 follow the rules exactly as stated by Kirkpatrick. However,
it does not seem these will produce stable statistics for repeated partial measurements.
7I have had to extrapolate some of these values, as Ravon and Vaidman only specify the updates for particular
measurements, instead of providing a complete set of rules. This does not impact on the measurement statistics
for the actual sequences considered. One modification allows PN (A) = 1/3, but still would not create a true PPS
paradox.
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Again, the PPS paradox occurs PM1(1|A) = PM2(2|A) = 1, but it fails to be a true PPS paradox
as PM1(A) = PM2(A) = 1/6 but PN (A) = 0.
A.3 Leifer and Spekken’s Ball Game
Leifer and Spekkens[LS05a] consider a ball within a square box. The ball may be in one of four
positions: top left; top right; bottom left; and bottom right. The box may be divided into two
compartments: either top-bottom or left-right. The location of the ball may only be measured
by dividing the box into two compartments and shaking one of the compartments. A rattling
sound indicates the ball is present but disturbs it. No rattle indicates the ball is in the other
compartment but does not disturb it. They consider preparing the ball to be in the bottom. Then
a measurement is made of either the left or right compartment, finally followed by a post-selection
on a successful top measurement.
λ1: Bottom left
λ2: Bottom right
λ3: Top left
λ4: Top right
The outcomes and updates are:
ML MR MT
L ¬L R ¬R T ¬T
λ1 (1; 1/2(λ1 + λ3)) 0 0 (1;λ1) 0 (1;λ1)
λ2 0 (1;λ2) (1; 1/2(λ2 + λ4)) 0 0 (1;λ2)
λ3 (1; 1/2(λ1 + λ3)) 0 0 (1;λ3) 0 (1; 1/2(λ3 + λ4))
λ4 0 (1;λ4) (1; 1/2(λ2 + λ4)) 0 0 (1; 1/2(λ3 + λ4))
The system is initially prepared in the state 1/2(λ1 + λ2). The probabilities of the sequences
are now:
ML
PML(T, L) = 1/4 PML(T,¬L) = 0
PML(¬T, L) = 1/4 PML(¬T,¬L) = 1/2
MR
PMR(T,R) = 1/4 PMR(T,¬R) = 0
PMR(¬T,R) = 1/4 PMR(¬T,¬R) = 1/2
N PN (T ) = 0
The PPS paradox occurs as PML(L|T ) = PMR(R|T ) = 1, but it fails to be a true PPS paradox as
PML(T ) = PMR(T ) = 1/4 but PN (T ) = 0. Unlike Kirkpatrick’s model, both macrorealism, in the
strong MR1 form, and NIM2 are guaranteed to hold. It follows that no possible modification of
this classical model could simulate the 3 Box Paradox or violate the Leggett Garg Inequality.
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